Abstract-A tunable measure for information leakage called maximal α-leakage is introduced. This measure quantifies the maximal gain of an adversary in refining a tilted version of its prior belief of any (potentially random) function of a dataset conditioning on a disclosed dataset. The choice of α determines the specific adversarial action ranging from refining a belief for α = 1 to guessing the best posterior for α = ∞, and for these extremal values this measure simplifies to mutual information (MI) and maximal leakage (MaxL), respectively. For all other α this measure is shown to be the Arimoto channel capacity. Several properties of this measure are proven including: (i) quasiconvexity in the mapping between the original and disclosed datasets; (ii) data processing inequalities; and (iii) a composition property.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information leakage metrics seek to quantify an adversary's ability of inferring information about one quantity from another. Mutual information (MI) is a classic measure for quantifying information and often used to measure information secrecy [2] or leakage in data publishing settings [3] , [4] . More recently, Issa et al. introduced a measure, called maximal leakage (MaxL), for a guessing adversary that quantifies the maximal multiplicative gain of an adversary, with access to a disclosed dataset, to guess any (possible random) function of the original dataset [5] .
Information leakage measures can be viewed through the lens of adversarial inference capabilities, and therefore, quantified via a loss function that the adversary seeks to minimize. The choice of a loss function provides a concrete measure of the gain in adversarial inference capability. For example, the definition of MaxL can be interpreted in terms of an adversary seeking to minimize the 0-1 loss function, which induces the adversary towards a hard decision, i.e., a maximum likelihood estimator. On the other hand, when MI is used as a leakage measure, the underlying loss function is the logarithmic loss (log-loss) function [6] - [8] , which models a (soft decision) belief-refining adversary. These two models capture two extremal actions of adversaries. Can these measures be viewed through the same framework? In this paper, we introduce a tunable measure, called maximal α-leakage, for information leakages, which encompasses MI (for α = 1) and MaxL (for α = ∞) and allows continuous interpolation between the two extremes. The parameter α can be viewed as a tunable This material is based upon work supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. CCF-1350914. parameter that determines how much weight the adversary gives to its posterior belief.
In this paper, we define two tunable measures for information leakages in Section III: α-leakage (Definition 4) and maximal α-leakage (Definition 5). In Section III, we prove that the α-leakage can be expressed as Arimoto mutual information (A-MI) (Theorem 1), and the maximal α-leakage is equivalent to the supremum of A-MI and Sibson mutual information (S-MI) (Theorem 2) over all distributions of the original dataset. In Section IV, we prove several important properties of the maximal α-leakage.
II. PRELIMINARIES
We begin by reviewing Rényi entropy and divergence [9] . Definition 1. Given a discrete distribution P X over a finite alphabet X , the Rényi entropy of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
Let Q X be a discrete distribution over X . The Rényi divergence (between P X and Q X ) of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
Both of the two quantities are defined by their continuous extension for α = 1 or ∞.
The α-leakage and max α-leakage metrics can be expressed in terms of Sibson mutual information (S-MI) [10] and Arimoto mutual information (A-MI) [11] . These quantities generalize the usual notion of MI. We review these definitions next.
Definition 2. Let discrete random variables (X, Y ) ∼ P XY with P X and P Y as the marginal distributions, respectively, and Q Y be an arbitrary marginal distribution of Y . The Sibson mutual information (S-MI) of order α ∈ (0, 1) ∪ (1, ∞) is defined as
where H α (X|Y ) is Arimoto conditional entropy of X given Y defined as
All of these quantities are defined by their continuous extension for α = 1 or ∞.
III. INFORMATION LEAKAGE MEASURES
In this section, we formally define the tunable leakage measures: α-leakage and maximal α-leakage.
Let X, Y and U be three discrete random variables with finite supports X , Y and U, respectively. LetX be an estimator of X and PX |Y indicate a strategy for estimating X given Y . We denote the probability of correctly estimating x given y as
Let X and Y represent the original data and disclosed data, respectively, and let U represent an arbitrary (potentially random) function of X that the adversary (a curious or malicious user of the disclosed data Y ) is interested in learning. In [12] , Issa et al. introduced MaxL to qualify the maximal gain in an adversary's ability of guessing U by knowing Y . We review the definition below.
. (9) where both estimatorsÛ andŨ take values from the same arbitrary finite support as U .
Remark 1.
Note that from (8), the numerator of the logarithmic term in (9) can be explicitly written as
In Definition 3, U represents any (possibly random) function of X. The numerator represents the maximal probability of correctly guessing U based on Y , while the denominator represents the maximal probability of correctly guessing U without knowing Y . Thus, MaxL quantifies the maximal gain (in bits) in guessing any possible function of X when an adversary has access to Y .
We now present α-leakage and maximal α-leakage (under the assumptions of discrete random variables and finite supports). The α-leakage measures various aspects of the leakage (ranging from the probability of correctly guessing to the posteriori distribution) about data X from the disclosed Y .
Definition 4 (α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution P XY and an estimatorX with the same support as X, the α-leakage from X to Y is defined as
for α ∈ (1, ∞) and by the continuous extension of (11) for α = 1 and ∞.
From (8), the numerator of the logarithmic term in (11) can be explicitly written as
Analogous to the analysis for MaxL in Remark 1, α-leakage quantifies the multiplicative increase in the expected reward for correctly inferring X when an adversary has access to Y . Whereas α-leakage captures how much an adversary can learn about X from Y , we also wish to quantify the information leaked about any function of X through Y . To this end, we define maximal α-leakage below.
Definition 5 (Maximal α-Leakage). Given a joint distribution P XY on finite alphabets X × Y, the maximal α-leakage from X to Y is defined as
where α ∈ [1, ∞], U represents any function of X and takes values from an arbitrary finite alphabet.
Remark 2. Note that the optimal P * X of the maximization in the denominator of the logarithmic term in (11) minimizes the expectation of the following loss function
for each α ∈ (1, ∞). The limit of the loss function in (14) leads to the log-loss (for α = 1) and 0-1 loss (for α = ∞) functions, respectively. In addition, for α = 1 and ∞, the maximal α-leakage simplifies to MI and MaxL, respectively. These comments are formalized in the following theorems.
The following theorem simplifies the expression of the α-leakage in (11) by solving the two maximizations in the logarithmic term.
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The proof hinges on solving the optimal estimations P * X|Y and P * X in (11) for knowing Y or not, respectively, as
and therefore, the logarithm of the ratio in (11) simplifies to A-MI. A detailed proof is in [1, Appx. A]. Making use of the conclusion in Theorem 1, the following theorem gives equivalent expressions for the maximal α-leakage.
where PX has the same support as P X .
Note that the maximal α-leakage is essentially the Arimoto channel capacity (with a support-set constrained input distribution) for α ≥ 1 [11] . This theorem is proved by first applying Theorem 1 to write the maximal α-leakage as
Subsequently, we upper bound the supremum of (18) by sup PX I A α (X; Y ), and then, show that the upper bound can be achieved by a specific U with H(X|U ) = 0. A detailed proof can be found in Appendix A.
IV. PROPERTIES OF MAXIMAL α-LEAKAGE
In this section, we will prove that maximal α-leakage has several properties that one would expect any reasonable leakage measure to have, including: (i) quasi-convexity in the conditional distribution P Y |X ; (ii) data processing inequalities; and (iii) a composition property.
These properties are proved in the following theorem, which makes use of the equivalent form of maximal alpha-leakage found in Theorem 2, as well as known properties of S-MI from [10] , [13] , [14] .
is monotonically non-decreasing in α; 3. satisfies data processing inequalities: let random variables X, Y, Z form a Markov chain, i.e.,
with equality if and only if X is independent of Y , and
with equality if X is a deterministic function of Y . 5. ≤ I S ∞ (P X , P Y |X ) with equality if P Y |X has either 0 or the maximal leakage in Part 4;
The equality holds if either P Y |X is symmetric 1 or P Y |X has 0 leakage.
A detailed proof is in [1, Appx. C].
Remark 3. Note that both MI and MaxL are convex in
Consider two disclosed versions Y 1 and Y 2 of X. The following theorem upper bounds the maximal α-leakage to an adversary who has access to both Y 1 and Y 2 simultaneously.
Theorem 4 (Composition Theorem). Given a Markov chain
This composition theorem allows composing multiple releases under a total leakage constraint. A detailed proof is in Appendix B.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Via α-and maximal α-leakage, we have introduced novel tunable measures for information leakage. These measures can find direct applications in privacy and secrecy problems. The choice of restricting either specific variables or all possible functions of a dataset determines the choice of α-and maximal α-leakage measures, respectively. Future work includes characterizing privacy-utility tradeoffs for these measures and evaluating existing privacy mappings against these metrics.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
From Theorem 1, we have for
If α = 1, we have
where the inequality is from data processing inequalities of MI [15, Thm 2.
, (26) which is exactly the expression of MaxL, and therefore, we have [12, Thm. 1]
For α ∈ (1, ∞), we provide an upper bound for L max α (X → Y ), and then, give an achievable scheme as follows.
where PX P X means the alphabet of PX is a subset of that of P X . The inequality in (28b) holds because the supremum of A-MI over all PŨ ,X on U × X is no less than that (in (28a)) over these P U,X constrained by the P X . The equations in (28c) and (28e) result from that A-MI and S-MI of order α > 0 have the same supremum [14, Thm. 5] ; and (28d) obeys the data processing inequalities [14, Thm. 3] . Lower bound: We lower bound (24) by consider a random variable U such that U − X − Y is a Markov chain and H(X|U ) = 0. Specifically, let the alphabet U consist of U x , a collection of U mapped to a x ∈ X , i.e., U = ∪ x∈X U x with U = u ∈ U x if and only if X = x. Therefore, for the specific variable U , we have
Construct a probability distribution PX over X from P U as
for all x ∈ X .
Thus,
where (31b) is because for any PX P X , it can be obtained through (30) by appropriately choosing P U . Therefore, combining (28) and (31), we obtain (17a).
APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Let Y 1 and Y 2 be the alphabets of Y 1 and Y 2 , respectively. For any (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ Y 1 × Y 2 , due to the Markov chain Y 1 − X − Y 2 , the corresponding entry of the conditional probability matrix of
Let K(y 1 ) = x∈X P X (x)P Y1|X (y 1 |x) α , for all y 1 ∈ Y 1 , such that we can construct a set of distributions over X as
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PX (x|y * 1 )P Y2|X (y 2 |x) PX (x)P Y2|X (y 2 |x)
where y * 1 in (39) is the optimal y 1 achieving the maximum in (38). Therefore, the equality in (38) holds if and only if, for all y 1 ∈ Y 1 , y2∈Y2 x∈X PX (x|y 1 )P Y2|X (y 2 |x) 
and the equality in (40) holds if and only if the optimal solutions P * X and P * X of the two maximizations in (40) satisfy, for all x ∈ X , P * X (x) = P * X (x)P α Y1|X (y * 1 |x) x∈X P X (x)P α Y1|X (y * 1 |x)
.
Now we consider α = 1. 
